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Effects of management style and quality on the operation of incentive pay: 
school teachers’ performance pay in England and Wales 2014-2015 
1.  The effect of management style and quality on performance related pay. 
In recent years, there has been a growing research programme on performance related pay 
incentives for professional and highly qualified workers, and notably in the education sector. 
This is a group of workers for whom management has limited control of the work process 
because of the former’s greater knowledge, and output is typically hard to measure in the 
short-term. They differ therefore from the windshield replacers of Lazear’s (1996) famous 
study, and those of an earlier generation of studies of piecework (eg. Brown 1962, Schmiede 
and Schudlich, 1976). Typically, performance pay involves an element of agreement over 
objectives, and managerial judgement as to whether or not they have been achieved, and the 
cycle of objective setting and review often implies a longer-duration employment relationship. 
Given the central role of management in the setting and appraising of objectives, it is natural 
to ask how far the quality of management affects any potential motivational effects of 
performance pay. Often this is hard to investigate because of selection effects: that well-
managed organisations may be more likely to adopt such practices. The new system for 
school teachers in England and Wales avoids this problem. Although schools have some 
flexibility over its implementation participation in the scheme and following its central 
provisions is compulsory for all state schools. Moreover, part of the brief of the national 
school inspectorate, Ofsted (England) and Estrin (Wales) is to monitor its operation in their 
school inspections. 
Recent work by economists has advanced our knowledge considerably in recent years owing 
to improved data availability and use of panel and quasi-experimental methods. Existing 
research showing that the effectiveness of individual teachers and the quality of school 
leadership can improve pupil outcomes has been reviewed by Murphy (2011, 2012) and 
Husain (2013).  There are considerable variations in teacher effectiveness in terms of pupil 
achievements, and especially for those from disadvantaged backgrounds (Murphy, 2013, 
Slater et al. 2012 for the UK, and for the US, Rivkin et al 2005, and Aaronson et al 2007). 
Moreover, differences in teachers' prior experience and educational qualifications appear to 
account for only a small part of differences in effectiveness. This strand of research 
emphasises two main policy instruments to improve teaching performance: incentives, and 
monitoring. 
Incentives for teachers have been found to improve student outcomes in a variety of 
educational systems, although as Podgursky and Springer (2007) observe, the number of 
studies remains fairly small, and the design of incentive schemes is very diverse. Atkinson et 
al (2009) found that many teachers in England had responded to the financial incentives 
provided by the Threshold system introduced in 2000, and that this raised pupil performance 
for eligible teachers, although the School Teachers Pay Review Body questioned whether this 
effect was sustained in succeeding years (STRB 2012). In Israel, Lavy (2009) found that 
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tournament-type incentives for teachers in schools for disadvantaged pupils led to improved 
pupil performance. In India, Muralidharan and Sunsaraman (2011) and Duflo et al (2012) 
also using quasi-experimental methods found that financial incentives for teachers helped 
improve pupil performance by reducing absenteeism. In the US, Figlio and Kenny (2007) 
found that pupils achieved better test scores in schools with merit pay systems. However, 
these authors also commented that the available data sets lacked detailed information about 
school human resource practices.  
Monitoring performance, how it is undertaken, on what it should focus, and its perceived 
fairness, is a key aspect of human resource policies. There has been concern that objective 
measures, such as value added in test scores, contain a lot of noise and fluctuate from year to 
year (Staiger and Rockoff, 2010), and they may bias performance in unintended ways, 
notably towards what can be measured (Murnane and Papay, 2010). This has led to increased 
research into the effects of subjective, or judgemental, measures. In the US, Rockoff and 
Speroni (2010) consider classroom observation by professional mentors and head teachers, 
and in England, Hussain (2013) considers judgements of school performance based on 
intensive observation of schools during Ofsted school inspections. Both studies find objective 
and judgemental measures are correlated but complementary as they convey different kinds 
of information about teaching and student progress. In particular, judgemental assessments by 
providing detailed feedback can improve performance by raising teaching skills (Taylor and 
Tyler, 2011). Reviewing the research from an economic perspective, Hanushek and Rivkin 
(2010) warn that despite the methodological quality of the individual research findings, 
concerns about accuracy, fairness, and potential adverse effects of incentives based on a 
limited set of outcomes raise worries about their use for education personnel and policy 
decisions. 
Monitoring performance also raises the question of procedural justice in human resource 
policies. The process by which employees’ objectives are set and their performance evaluated 
is critical, particularly where evaluation is dependent on line-manager judgements. It is 
widely argued that goal setting and appraisal systems, if they are to be effective, should be 
considered by employees to be fair and unbiased (Latham and Pinder, 2005), and to respect 
their own work values and desire for autonomy in their work (Bakker et al. 2007). This 
research also emphasises the importance of organisational support in the form of feedback, 
training and other resources to ensure employees have the means to achieve higher 
performance. Cropanzano et al (2007) argue that practices such as appraisal need to be 
governed by fair procedures (procedural justice), because if employees suspect management 
will conduct evaluations in bad faith, then they will adapt their behaviour accordingly, even 
when they have unequivocal evidence to the contrary. This will lead to greater resistance to 
management and a lesser willingness among employees to engage in 'organisational 
citizenship behaviour' (Shapiro and Kirkman, 2001). Erdogan et al (2001) find that fairness is 
needed both at the level of an appraisal system and its criteria, and at that of the behaviour of 
individual raters in such areas as feedback. Reviewing 35 years of empirical research on goal 
setting, Locke and Latham (2002) argue that employee involvement in goal setting, as 
opposed to 'top down' approaches, can benefit motivation not only by ensuring better 
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informed and more realistic goals, but also by encouraging employees to take greater 
ownership of their goals. Recent research has emphasised the role of appraisal in motivating 
better performance by fostering employee engagement (Gruman and Saks, 2011). This builds 
on a longer standing theme in the literature on employees' desires for autonomy and self-
determination in their work, and ‘voice’ to influence their objectives, something likely to be 
important among teachers (Gagné and Forest, 2008, Cawley et al., 2001). The importance of 
the HR considerations is enhanced by the work of Kahneman and Tversky (2000) which 
shows that most people are twice as averse to potential losses as they are motivated by gains. 
The atmosphere in which performance management is operated can affect whether employees 
perceive it as taking something away from them, substituting conditional for automatic pay 
progression, or providing greater rewards and recognition for good performers.  
Thus, the HR management research complements that of the economists, suggesting that if 
linking pay to performance is to motivate highly skilled professionals such as teachers, then 
one has to look closely at how well the establishment of objectives and evaluation procedures 
are operated and correspond to their aspirations. This paper focuses on employee motivation, 
that is, their willingness to perform. It explores how this is influenced by uneven access to 
performance pay increments, how well they believe managers run the appraisal and objective 
setting procedures in their schools, how far they feel management involves them in the 
establishment of the school-wide objectives into which their personal objectives are meant to 
be embedded, and at the general quality of management in their schools as evaluated by 
school inspectors.  
This paper seeks to advance your understanding by drawing on both research streams 
considering both the incentive aspect of performance pay progression, and the quality of 
school leadership as seen in part by individual teachers, but also as assessed by school 
inspectors. It starts with a short presentation of key features of the performance pay scheme, 
followed by a brief description of the survey and methods. It then presents a descriptive 
account of teachers’ perceptions of the scheme’s motivation and divisiveness before turning 
to an analysis of the effects of some key factors on these perceptions. The first is the effect of 
teachers’ position on their pay spine, as this determines their access to pay advancement. 
Comparing teachers who are eligible for performance pay progression with those who are not 
provides an indication of the salience of performance pay for teachers, and thus to its 
potential incentive effect, This serves also as a control variable for subsequent analysis of the 
link with appraisal quality, involvement, as seen by teachers themselves, and of leadership 
quality as seen by school inspectors. Finally, the paper examines whether teachers who said 
performance pay motivated them in 2014 were more likely to achieve their objectives in 2015. 
2.  The Performance pay system for teachers in England and Wales 
The new system of performance pay for school teachers in England and Wales was 
introduced in state primary and secondary schools in 2013, and set out to revitalise and 
extend an earlier scheme introduced in 2000 (see DfE, 2014). First performance payments 
under the new scheme were made in the summer of 2014.  
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The scheme comprises three main elements: (i) to replace the former six annual pay 
increments for teachers on the ‘Main Scale’ by performance-based progression; (ii) to restore 
the performance element in progression at the ‘Threshold’ between the Main and the Upper 
pay scales, and (iii) to reinvigorate the performance element in progression on the three 
points on the Upper pay scale. The School Teachers Pay Review Body judged that the latter 
two had both lost their bite since their introduction in 2000 (STRB 2012).2  
Performance evaluation begins by agreeing objectives at the start of the school year, mid-year 
feedback, and final assessment against the agreed objectives and national teacher standards at 
the end of the school year. This assessment should comprise a recommendation on pay which 
has to be reviewed by the school’s senior management, and endorsed by the school’s 
governing body. In their triennial school visitations, national school inspectors from the 
Office for Standards in Education, Ofsted, scrutinise whether performance awards are 
tracking overall pupil performance in the school. 
3.  The Survey 
This study comprises a mixture of data from a survey of individual teachers which is linked 
to school-level data from the Education Department, and notably school inspection reports. 
For the survey, at the outset of the study, wide consultation was undertaken with all the main 
stakeholders, including the teachers’ and head teachers’ associations, the national 
representatives of school governors, of the local government employers in England and 
Wales, and with the Education Department. The stakeholders provided advice on the 
questionnaire design, and the unions also enabled it to be tested in focus groups of their 
members. The questionnaire was administered by the unions sending emails to a sample of 
their membership inviting them to reply via a link to an online confidential questionnaire held 
at a secure location. The survey has been funded by the STICERD research centre at the 
London School of Economics, and is part of the continuing independent research on 
performance pay by LSE’s Centre for Economic Performance.3 
So far, four surveys have been carried out, in the spring of 2014,, before the scheme came 
into effect and annually thereafter. This paper focuses on the results of the first two waves. In 
2014, 4,372 usable replies were received, and in 2014, 1,306, and the panel element 
comprises about 750 individuals. The main focus in this paper is on the panel respondents 
because they enable one to compare replies from the same individuals in both years. In this 
paper, these results are linked to school level data from the Education Department and the 
school inspectorate’s evaluation of school leadership.. 
As with all voluntary surveys, there is the possibility of bias arising from those who feel most 
strongly about the topic being the most willing to put aside their free time to respond. This is 
explored in more detail in Appendix 2 (available on request). Nevertheless, the sample 
response shows a good coverage of the general demographic characteristics of teachers, and 
by school type from the School Workforce Census. Some of the key attitudinal findings were 
also compared with those of the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Survey on teachers’ 
views about relationships in their schools shows that the current sample for 2014 is only 
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moderately more negative than in WERS, but this may also reflect a real change in attitudes 
owing to the uncertainties attached to the new pay system, and widespread concerns about 
budgets and teachers’ workloads. There is some tendency for more senior teachers to respond, 
and as a result, most of the tables showing percentage distributions have been weighted to 
take account of this. 
4.  Teachers’ assessment of performance pay and changes after one year of 
operation 
In jobs that require employees to exercise a good deal of judgement and discretion in how 
they are carried out, management has to rely heavily upon their motivation. Although many 
teachers may feel that government targets and monitoring have increased greatly in recent 
decades, the nature of their tasks remains far more complex than administering bureaucratic 
routines or manual tasks that can be easily measured. Schools rely on teachers to work 
conscientiously with their students, constantly adapting to their educational and disciplinary 
needs. Hence, they rely heavily on teacher motivation. As motivation is a psychological state, 
the natural starting point when investigating the effects of performance pay schemes for this 
type of job is to enquire whether employees perceive them as motivating, relevant to their 
work, and fairly operated. 
The motivational questions were divided roughly equally between those focusing on potential 
strengths and those focusing on potential weaknesses of performance pay for teachers. Thus 
among the first category were factors relating to its perceived motivation, including views 
about the principle of linking their pay to performance, whether doing so meant that good 
teaching is properly rewarded and is fairer, whether it helped them focus more on the 
objectives established in the performance review, whether it gave them an incentive to sustain 
or improve teaching quality, whether ssessment should, as it does, include elements of pupil 
progress, and whether it provides and incentive to remain a teacher. Among the second 
category, questions focused on factors that might contribute to perceived divisiveness, 
including potential favouritism, resentment between those who get awards and those who do 
not, whether it is seen primarily as a device to increase work intensity, whether it conflicts 
with team work in schools, whether the size of payments is too small to provide an incentive, 
whether teachers consider their work is already at an appropriate standard, and whether their 
school can afford to pay an award even if it is merited. Such factors could contribute to 
perceived divisiveness because they distort the distribution of awards, and prevent the 
scheme from meeting its stated aim of incentivising better teaching. The theoretical rationale 
behind these questions is provided by expectancy theory (Lawler 1971), which proposes that 
employees will respond to incentives if they value them (valence), if they have scope within 
their jobs to increase performance (instrumentality), and if they believe that management will 
measure and reward it competently and fairly (expectancy). This can be seen as a virtuous 
circle of positive motivation, but breaks in the linkages can also lead to a downward cycle 
leading to perceived divisiveness. This framework is congruent with the theory of incentives 
in mainstream personnel economics (eg. Lazear 2007), and so provides a convenient 
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approach to measuring employee perceptions of motivation and divisiveness. These questions 
were trialed on focus groups of teachers. 
The responses to these two sets of questions are summarised in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. 
Both tables show how teachers’ responses spread across the scale from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree with the statements in the questionnaire, the number of respondents in the 
panel in each year. As all sample surveys involve a margin of statistical error, the table also 
includes an indication of whether the difference shown between the two years might have 
come about by chance. Thus, for the first question in Table 1, about the principle of linking 
pay to performance, one can see that between 2014 and 2015 teachers have become more 
negative, and this change of this size is unlikely to have come about by chance (less than 1% 
probability (0.001). 
Responses to all of the questions in Table 1 tend towards the negative end of the spectrum in 
both years, indicating that most teachers do not find PRP motivating: most remain opposed to 
the principle of linking pay progression to performance, they don’t believe it means that good 
teaching is properly rewarded, or that it will result in a fairer allocation of pay, nor do most 
believe that it provides an incentive either to sustain or improve their quality teaching, to take 
performance review more seriously, or to remain in teaching. That said, on certain questions, 
around one fifth of teachers are more positive than their colleagues, notably on the principle, 
on reward for good teaching, on performance reviews, and on taking account of pupil 
performance in teachers’ evaluation. 
On the more negative aspects summarised in Table 2, teachers’ responses also tend towards 
the negative side: most find it divisive. Consistently, between 70% and 80% of respondents 
suspect awards will be based on favouritism, that giving awards will create resentment among 
those who do not receive them, that the basic intention is to increase workloads, that the 
incentive is too small, that teachers already work at an appropriate standard, that its 
individual focus conflicts with team work in schools, and that their schools cannot afford to 
pay for performance even when it is merited. Although it may be suspected that discontented 
teachers responded disproportionately to the survey, these results are consistent with those of 
earlier surveys of classroom teachers and to a lesser degree of head teachers by the author in 
1996/7 and in 2000/04 (Marsden and French, 1998, and Marsden and Belfield, 2000). 
New pay systems introduce uncertainty into workplaces, and so one might expect initial 
reactions of suspicion and hostility before they bed down. Employees and managers who 
have become used to how the previous system worked, and who have developed a good 
working relationship under its auspices, may find these patterns of work challenged by major 
changes in the pay rules. Norms of fairness often also play an important part in pay, and these 
too can be disrupted by new pay systems: for example, people may accept seniority pay 
because they know their turn will come, but when the rules are changed they may feel 
cheated if their expected progression is jeopardised. Often too the weaker party in a 
bargaining relationship may fear that management will use the new rules to impose changes 
unilaterally, and use the increased uncertainty of the new system to its advantage, for 
example, by making pay progression depend upon employees accepting changes against their 
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will. Often too the uncertainty can generate a degree of suspicion about management’s 
intentions which may subsequently prove to be unfounded. Hence, there are many reasons 
why one might expect initially negative employee views about a new pay system to moderate 
once they experience its operation in practice. 
Table 1:  Potentially motivating aspects of linking teachers’ pay progression to 
performance: panel responses (weighted) 
 
Disagree 
strongly Disagree 
Hard to 
say Agree 
Agree 
strongly Total % N 
Prob 
Chi2 
 
Is a good principle 
2014 32.0 24.4 15.6 25.6 2.5 100 784 
  2015 38.6 23.7 18.5 16.9 2.3 100 745 0.001 **** 
 
It means that good teaching is properly rewarded 
2014 33.9 28.6 14.5 20.1 3.0 100 785 
  2015 41.0 27.4 15.5 13.8 2.3 100 746 0.005 **** 
 
It will result in a fairer allocation of pay 
2014 41.6 39.7 11.8 6.2 0.7 100 782 
  2015 47.6 32.5 15.2 3.8 0.9 100 745 0.004 **** 
 
It will make me take the objectives of my performance review more seriously 
2014 28.4 23.5 23.0 21.9 3.2 100 784 
  2015 35.7 32.8 12.5 15.6 3.4 100 743 0.000 **** 
 
It will give me a real incentive to improve/sustain the quality of my teaching 
2014 42.2 32.1 19.4 5.5 0.9 100 784 
  2015 46.5 35.7 9.9 7.0 0.9 100 745 0.000 **** 
 
It is good that individual teachers' pay should take some account of pupil performance 
2014 27.3 28.2 22.9 20.2 1.4 100 784 
  2015 27.7 33.2 20.7 17.9 0.6 100 743 0.129 + 
 
It makes it more attractive for me to remain a teacher 
2014 53.6 26.8 14.5 4.5 0.7 100.0 784 
  2015 56.0 30.0 9.2 3.5 1.3 100.0 745 0.015 *** 
 
Note: statistical significance: significant at <1% ****; at <2% *** ; at <5%, **  ; <10%, * ; <20%  + . A Chi 2 
probability greater than 10% (0.1) signifies that there was probably no change in teachers’ views between 2014 
and 2015. Panel sample weighted to take account of higher response rate among more senior teachers using 
School Workforce Census 2013 distribution by spine point. 
This benign expectation does not appear to be justified, at least for the sample of teachers in 
the panel survey. Their scepticism about the principle and the purported benefits of the new 
system appears if anything to have intensified with the experience of its first year of 
operation. On the principle, and on fairness, the share of negative and doubtful (‘hard to say’) 
views appears to have increased. On reinforcing the performance review and on incentives to 
sustain or improve teaching views have become more polarised as the ‘hard to says’ have 
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declined sharply, moving towards negative. In contrast, the question on whether it provides 
an incentive to remain a teacher, which was overwhelmingly negative before the new scheme 
came into operation, remains unchanged over the period.  
Table 2:  Potentially divisive aspects of linking teachers’ pay progression to 
performance: panel responses 
 
Disagree 
strongly Disagree 
Hard to 
say Agree 
Agree 
strongly Total % N 
Prob 
Chi2 
 
Leaders will use performance pay to reward their favourites 
2014 2.7 1.9 4.0 37.6 53.8 100 784 
  2015 2.7 0.6 5.3 40.9 50.5 100 746 0.0634 * 
 
It will cause resentment among teachers who feel they perform well but do not receive an award 
2014 2.4 6.4 20.6 32.5 38.1 100 785 
  2015 2.8 7.1 24.7 31.8 33.6 100 745 0.2561 - 
 
For all that is said about improving teaching quality, the new pay system is simply a device to get more work 
done 
2014 2.4 4.7 23.7 34.7 34.5 100 785 
  2015 2.7 5.8 19.2 36.8 35.6 100 746 0.3179 - 
 
The link is problematic because it is hard to relate the work done in schools to individual performance 
2014 0.9 2.2 7.1 31.9 58.0 100 784 
  2015 1.6 1.9 6.2 36.0 54.3 100 745 0.272 - 
 
It will have no effect on the quality of my work because it is already at the appropriate standard 
2014 2.1 4.7 18.7 35.4 39.2 100 784 
  2015 2.4 4.4 17.9 36.9 38.4 100 743 0.953 - 
 
The size of payments is too small to make me want to work harder to get them 
2014 4.0 10.9 46.1 25.2 13.8 100 785 
  2015 5.5 12.4 32.6 29.9 19.6 100 742 0.000 **** 
 
Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt if my school can afford to reward me with a pay rise 
2014 2.2 5.3 22.0 33.6 36.9 100 785 
  2015 2.3 8.0 21.2 27.3 41.2 100 745 0.0384 ** 
Panel sample, weighted to take account of higher response rate among more senior teachers using School 
Workforce Census 2013 distribution by spine point. 
Turning to the ‘divisiveness’ questions (Table 2), about perceived favouritism, resentments, 
and the perceived mismatch between the scheme and teachers’ views about the nature of their 
work, the picture was negative in 2014, and experience of the first year of operation of the 
scheme does not appear to have brought about any significant change in teachers’ views. The 
exceptions concern a slight decline in perceived favouritism, and increased scepticism about 
the amount of money available as an incentive, and whether the school can afford to award 
performance pay rises. The latter two may reflect the general conditions of financial austerity 
during the scheme’s implementation. 
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These results are general, across all teachers in the panel sample, are also consistent with 
those of the full sample which was compared separately with the panel results. However, not 
all teachers have the same opportunity to gain performance increments, such as those at the 
top of their respective pay scales, and this could affect perceptions of motivation and fairness. 
Two questions emerge: performance related pay progression was introduced at a time of 
severe public sector pay restraint, so that the opinions expressed could reflect general 
discontent with pay; and how far dissatisfaction is about the spread of a performance culture 
in schools, of which performance management is a central part, rather than about pay itself. 
The next section explores this by examining how teachers’ pay scale position affects their 
views on whether PRP motivates.  
5.  The influence of teachers’ position on the pay-spine on views of performance pay 
With complex reward systems, such as when pay progression is conditional on a process of 
objective setting and performance appraisal, employees’ judgements of them may be holistic, 
bundling together views about pay and appraisal, and it is possible that views about appraisal 
may crowd out those of incentive pay. One way to gauge the salience of pay as opposed to 
appraisal is to examine the experience of teachers who are subject to appraisal, but whose pay 
will not be affected by its outcome. This can be done by comparing the experience of those 
who were at the top of their pay scale in 2014 when the new scheme came into effect with 
those on the rungs below.  
According to the School Workforce Census, in 2012/13, 35% of teachers were on the six 
point Main Scale, below its maximum, M6, and under the old scheme, would have been 
eligible for automatic annual pay progression. The same source also shows that around 40% 
of all classroom teachers were at the top of their respective pay scales, 13% at the top of the 
Main Scale, and 26% at the top of the Upper Scale. 4 Using the survey returns, a pay 
progression transition matrix for 2014-2015 reflects these percentages on their respective 
maxima, but also shows that a proportion of teachers at other points who might formerly have 
progressed did not do so. A fifth of those on M5 did not progress to M6, and about half of 
those on M6, and eligible to progress through the Threshold to the Upper Pay Scale stayed 
put. On the two lower rungs of the Upper Scale, about a third stayed put, although it should 
be said that progression there was originally designed to be performance related, although the 
STRB was skeptical about this in its 2012 report. Thus pay could be salient at different points 
on the pay scales: for those on M5, replacement of seniority by performance could be 
experienced as the loss of an entitlement. For those on M6, and ready for Threshold 
assessment and progression, the tightening up on assessments could also be experienced as a 
loss. On the other hand, teachers who progressed would not have experienced loss of 
anticipated pay increments, at least for the time being, and may even appreciate the 
opportunity. 
We now turn to the effects of scope for pay progression at different positions on the pay spine 
on perceived motivation and divisiveness. The survey results enable the linking of 
information of teachers’ current position on their pay scales to perceptions of motivation and 
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divisiveness of performance pay (Table 3). To explore these, the questions in Tables 1 and 2 
were combined into indexes of positive motivation and divisiveness using factor analysis. In 
effect, these indexes show where an individual teacher’s responses stand in relation to the 
average for all teachers in the sample: that is whether their individual perceptions of 
motivation or divisiveness of PRP are above or below the average. 5 As can be seen from 
Tables 1 and 2, the ‘average view’ is that PRP is not very motivating, and it is somewhat 
divisive. Views on PRP were then regressed on whether teachers had progressed up a spine 
point in 2014-15, and whether they had been on the maximum for their pay spine in 2014. 
Because opportunities for progression may vary for part-time teachers, and because there 
may be gender differences in attitudes, and because relations may differ between primary and 
secondary schools, the former often being smaller and more informal, these variables were 
also included. The summary and more detailed results for the panel respondents are shown in 
the two panels in Table 3.  
In the left-hand panel, the most striking point is that receiving a performance pay progression 
in is associated with a more positive than average view of performance pay as a motivator: 
receiving an award is associated with teachers being 26% (0.263) more likely to be more 
positive than average about performance pay. On the other hand, being at the top of their pay 
spine, and thus ineligible for an award,  means that they are about 18% more negative than 
average about its motivational aspects (-0.175). The same regression done for divisiveness, 
not displayed here, shows that being on the spine max increases perceived divisiveness about 
20%.  
The survey data also enable a more detailed look at individual spine points, and thus make it 
possible to disentangle the effects of different aspects of performance pay in schools (see the 
right-hand panel). This panel further distinguishes those who received pay progression in 
2015 from those who did not. Thus, teachers on M5 and M6 in 2015 who had not progressed 
find performance pay less motivating than average (M6: -0.350, and U3: -0.191). On the 
intervening spine positions, apart from M5, there was no particular influence on perceived 
motivation.6 This suggests that being on one’s spine maximum contributes to the view that 
PRP is not motivating. In contrast, those who had progressed to these positions in 2015 were 
much more positive about performance pay: those who just progressed to M6 were 50% 
(0.526) more positive than average, and those on U1, having just passed the Threshold, were 
71% (0.709) more so. 
To judge from the differential relationships between pay spine position and teachers’ 
perceptions of whether the new system is motivating or not, pay is clearly a salient factor 
affecting both negative and positive views. It is also clear that these judgements are much 
more than general dissatisfaction with pay restraint. Such dissatisfaction is most intense at the 
points where the incentive elements of the scheme bite sharpest.  
The next section explores two potential channels through which the nature of the objective 
setting and appraisal process may influence perceptions of motivation and divisiveness. They 
concern whether appraisals are seen as being conducted in a systematic fashion, and whether 
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teachers feel involved in determining the overall objectives set out in the School 
Development Plan which is designed to play a central role in the objective setting process. 
 
Table 3: Teachers’ views of performance pay according to movement on their pay spine: 
20157 
PRP motivates Coef. Std. Err. Sig  Coef. Std. Err. Sig  
    
   Movement up a spine  
point 2014-2015 0.263  0.081  **** 
   On spine max in 2015 -0.175  0.072  *** 
   Spine Point in 2015       
M3-M4 
   
0.120  0.176  - 
M5 
   
-0.970  0.117  **** 
M6 
   
-0.350  0.163  ** 
U1 
   
-0.078  0.194  - 
U2 
   
0.110  0.192  - 
U3 
   
-0.191  0.115  * 
Leadership scale 
   
0.231  0.326  - 
Progression 2014-2015 to:       
M3_4 
   
0.271  0.259  - 
M5 
   
0.979  0.189  **** 
M6 
   
0.526  0.220  *** 
U1 (passing Threshold) 
   
0.709  0.283  *** 
U2 
   
-0.073  0.197  - 
U3 
   
0.065  0.123  - 
Leadership scale 
   
0.435  0.405  - 
Part-time -0.199  0.085  *** -0.169  0.088  * 
Female 0.036  0.080  - 0.048  0.082  - 
Primary school 0.053  0.084  - 0.029  0.083  - 
Constant -0.072  0.085  - -0.056  0.111  - 
    
   
Number of obs 790 
  
790   
Prob > F 0.000 
 
**** 0.000  **** 
R-squared 
0.0378 
  
0.0868 
  
Notes: Regression weighted according to 2013 SWFC distribution of teachers by salary point. Spine point 
effects take junior teachers as the benchmark (unqualified and on points M1 and M2).8 
Notes: OLS regression. Panel sample. Weighted to adjust for over-response in higher spine points using the 
SWFC 2013 distribution. Statistical significance: significant at <1% ****; at <2% *** ; at <5%, **  ; <10%, * ; 
<20%  + .  Indicators of PRP motivates and divisiveness derived using factor analysis based on questions in 
Tables 1 and 2, and missing observations for 2015 were assigned the value of the previous year. Movement up a 
spine point was calculated by comparing teachers’ positions on their pay spine in 2014 with an estimate of their 
position in 2015. The same regressions for perceived divisiveness show it increased and was strongly significant 
with respect to being on the maximum of the teacher’s pay spine (coefficient: 0.180), other coefficients in the 
left-hand panel of the table were not statistically significant. On the more detailed breakdown in the right hand 
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panel, divisiveness was significantly lower among teachers on M3_4 (-0.33), and among those who had just 
passed the threshold onto U1 (-0.47). All other variables were non-significant. 
6.  The influence of appraisal procedures and participative leadership 
Existing research findings on whether employees find PRP motivating or divisive suggests 
that the quality of appraisal procedures and how far managers involve them in shaping 
performance objectives play an important role. Employees are more likely to find 
performance pay motivating if they believe evaluations of their performance are accurate and 
fair (Lawler, 1971, Latham and Locke, 2002), and they are more likely to take ownership of 
their objectives if they are involved in their formulation (Cawley et al, 1998). 
Table 4: Objectives and feedback in performance reviews9 
Objective setting 
 
Feedback 
Review established specific objectives?  Did review give feedback? (a) 
 No 
Yes, 
to 
some 
extent 
Yes, 
defin-
itely 
Total 
% N  No 
Yes, 
to 
some 
extent 
Yes, 
defin-
itely 
Total 
% N 
2014 1.2 18.5 80.3 100 670  23.0 23.3 53.7 100 789 
2015 1.2 20.8 78.1 100 656  16.0 19.7 64.3 100 776 
Prob 
Ch2 
   
0.653 -  
   
0.000 **** 
Know how objectives will be monitored? 
 
Feedback: give reasons? 
2014 8.5 40.2 51.3 100 669 
 
13.7 52.2 34.1 100 484 
2015 7.5 40.0 52.4 100 656 
 
11.9 46.8 41.3 100 527 
Prob 
Chi2 
   
0.837 -  
   
0.075 * 
Objectives include indicators of pupil progress? 
 
Feedback: linked to performance against 
previous objectives?  
2014 4.1 11.7 84.2 100 671 
 
8.6 36.8 54.7 100 486 
2015 5.2 11.7 83.1 100 655 
 
9.0 38.7 52.3 100 527 
Prob 
Chi2 
   
0.616 -  
   
0.775 - 
Opportunity to discuss objectives in review? 
 
Feedback referred to classroom observation? 
2014 13.0 30.5 56.6 100.0 670 
 
17.9 30.3 51.8 100 485 
2015 12.5 34.7 52.8 100.0 655 
 
14.3 38.1 47.6 100 527 
Prob 
Chi2    0.287 
- 
    0.022 ** 
Know how your appraisal will be linked to pay? 
 
Feedback: include recommendation on pay? 
2014 40.5 34.5 25.0 100 667 
 
71.2 8.5 20.3 100 466 
2015 36.8 27.9 35.3 100 655 
 
48.6 12.1 39.4 100 527 
Prob 
Chi2    0.000 ****  
   
0.000 **** 
Note (a) The response categories for the first question were: no, not applicable, yes. Panel sample, weighted. 
Prob chi 2: a figure greater than 0.1 signifies a more than 10% chance that the changes shown between 2014 and 
2015 are due to statistical error. In other words, we can infer that there was no actual change in teachers’ views. 
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To explore the link between attitudes to PRP and appraisal quality and participatory objective 
setting the most factual of the survey’s questions relating to the latter were chosen. This is to 
minimise the risk that attitudes to PRP will colour teachers’ perceptions of appraisal and 
involvement: for example, hostility to PRP could lead teachers to question the fairness of 
appraisal. Thus appraisal quality here refers primarily to teachers’ views as to how 
systematically performance reviews are operated. As a first step, Table 4 reports teachers’ 
reports of their experience of objective setting and feedback in appraisals, focusing on 
whether aspects of their reviews which are specified in Education Department guidelines 
have been carried out in their case (see DfE 2012 and 2014). To facilitate comparisons before 
and after introduction of the new link with pay, Table 4 results are confined to the same 
teachers who responded in both 2014 and 2015: the panel sample.  
Procedures for objective setting appear somewhat better embedded than those for feedback. 
Almost all reviews in 2014 established specific objectives for the coming year, leaving only 
modest scope for improvement in 2015. In contrast, feedback appears to have been less well 
embedded in 2014, and to have shown some improvement by 2015: the proportion in the 
panel reporting no feedback fell from 23% to 16%.10 Several of the other questions revealed 
little change with the introduction of a more systematic link with pay. The big exception 
concerns an increase in the proportion of teachers who definitely know how their objectives 
will be linked with pay (up from 25% to 35%), and receiving a recommendation on pay in 
their performance review (up from 20% to 39%).  
To explore the link between the quality of performance review procedures and experiences 
with performance pay, the questions in Table 4 were condensed into an index using factor 
analysis based on the full sample for both years, similar to that used for whether PRP was 
seen as motivating or divisive.11 Teachers’ replies were then divided according to whether 
their factor scores were above or below the mean. Thus, in Table 5, in 2015, better quality 
appraisal procedures were associated with a greater proportion of teachers reporting relatively 
positive attitudes to PRP: 48% compared with 42%. Likewise, in 2015, more systematic 
appraisal procedures were associated with less teachers finding PRP divisive (42% compared 
with 56%), more systematic appraisals being those that conformed more closely to official 
guidelines. It appears also that the relationship between use of systematic procedures for 
appraisal and positive attitudes to PRP has strengthened between 2014 and 2014, and its 
statistical significance has increased. This is likely to reflect changing practice in schools as 
the new link with pay makes performance reviews a higher priority for all concerned. 
An important part of the policy of objective setting and performance appraisal in schools has 
been to link classroom performance to the wider performance objectives of the school. The 
reforms introduced in 2000 took a step in this direction as classroom objectives were meant 
to be related to the wider goals of the school as set out in its School Development Plan, 
sometimes also called the School Improvement Plan. All schools are obliged to have such a 
plan. When Marsden and Belfield (2007) studied the evolution of the 2000 scheme, they 
found evidence that an increasing minority of schools by 2004 had joined up the different 
levels of objective setting. If organisations are to have clear goals to guide leadership 
decisions and which inform the performance reviews of individual employees, then they have 
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a choice between ‘top-down’ management in which organisational objectives are ‘cascaded 
down’ to the objectives of individual employees, and a more collegial approach in which 
organisational objectives inform individual objectives, but employees are involved in 
establishing organisational priorities. Thus, an important question about the nature of 
objective setting in schools concerns how far leaders involve classroom teachers in 
formulating and establishing school priorities, in this case, those of the School Development 
Plan (SDP) (see for example Pearce et al. 2007, and Nicolaides et al., 2014). In the survey, 
teachers were asked a number of questions about leadership in their school, and this was the 
one that was most objective and most specifically related to performance management in 
schools. The middle panel of Table 5 reports teachers’ views on how well their school leaders 
involve them in developing the priorities of the School Development Plan. Greater teacher 
involvement is associated with more favourable views of PRP, and with fewer teachers 
finding it divisive.  
The final panel of Table 5 explores the relationship between systematic appraisals and 
teacher involvement in the school development plan. Although positive, the relationship is 
weak and not statistically significant. One reason for this may be that the questions selected 
for systematic appraisal relate closely to the official guidance, and say little about whether the 
process is mechanistic or supportive. Remember that the appraisal fairness questions were 
omitted from this analysis to avoid potential halo effects from views of PRP. Thus it is quite 
possible that schools with top-down management do appraisal systematically, but do not 
involve teachers in the overall objectives of the school. 
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Table 5: Relationship between how teachers view PRP, and systematic appraisal 
procedures and participatory management in schools12 
 PRP Motivates 2014   PRP Motivates 2015   
Systematic appraisal 
procedures 
Less 
positive 
More 
positive 
Total
 % 
Sampl
e N 
Less 
positive 
More 
positive 
Total
 % 
Sampl
e N 
Better than average 47.6 52.4 100 459 51.5 48.5 100 489 
Below average 43.0 57.0 100 318 58.3 41.7 100 248 
prob Ch2 
  
0.269 - 
  
0.134 + 
         
 
PRP divisive 2014 
  
PRP divisive 2015 
  Systematic appraisal 
procedures 
More 
divisive 
Less 
divisive Total 
 
More 
divisive 
Less 
divisive Total 
 Better than average 49.7 50.3 100 463 41.7 58.3 100 488 
Below average 47.2 52.8 100 319 56.2 43.9 100 251 
prob Ch2 
  
0.547 - 
  
0.001 **** 
	
 PRP Motivates 2014   PRP Motivates 2015   
Leaders involve  
teachers in SDP 
Less 
positive 
More 
positive 
Total 
% 
Sampl
e N 
Less 
positive 
More 
positive 
Total 
% 
Sampl
e N 
Leaders involve 39.1 60.9 100 155 48.0 52.0 100 170 
Leaders don’t involve/ 
not sure 46.9 53.1 100 622 55.9 44.1 100 567 
   
0.139 + 
  
0.119 + 
         
 
PRP divisive 2014 
  
PRP divisive 2015 
  Leaders involve  
teachers in SDP 
More 
divisive 
Less 
divisive Total 
 
More 
divisive 
Less 
divisive Total 
 Leaders involve 37.9 62.1 100 155 29.7 70.3 100 169 
Leaders don’t involve/ 
not sure 51.3 48.8 100 627 52.5 47.5 100 570 
prob Ch2 
  
0.013 *** 
  
0.000 **** 
	
 Leaders involve teachers in developing priorities of the SDP 
 
2014 
  
2015 
  Systematic 
appraisal 
procedures 
Leaders  
don’t 
involve/  
not sure 
Leaders 
involve 
Total 
% 
Sampl
e N 
Leaders  
don’t  
involve/   not 
sure 
Leaders 
involve 
Total 
% 
Sampl
e N 
Better than 
average 81.8 18.2 100 467 76.3 23.7 100 510 
Below average 77.2 22.8 100 325 81.5 18.6 100 282 
prob Ch2 
 
 0.175 + 
  
0.145 + 
 
Note: panel sample weighted. 
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7.  School management quality and performance pay 
One of the major unresolved questions in relation to performance pay and appraisal is their 
relation to the overall quality of management in an organisation. Often, empirical studies of 
PRP are confined to a single organisation so it is not easy to explore the effect of variations in 
management quality. Often too when there are multi-organisational studies, there are 
significant variations in the design of PRP systems, and there is also a problem of selection 
bias, that ‘better’ managed or more successful units are more likely to experiment with new 
reward practices. The new pay system for teachers avoids many of these problems because 
the scheme is compulsory for all schools, however they are managed, and local management 
has some autonomy over how it is implemented. The reports on appraisal and involvement 
just reviewed provide valuable insights into key processes of school performance 
management as seen by teachers, but for a more thorough and independent assessment we 
turn to the national school inspectorate reports conducted by Ofted in England and Estyn in 
Wales. 
These are normally based on evidence provided by the school, and a two-day intensive site 
visit that involves meetings with school leadership, teachers, students and parents, together 
with classroom observation. In recent years, school inspectors have been required to enlarge 
their brief from educational attainments to include the quality of school leadership and 
management processes with a focus on how they contribute to educational outcomes. As 
defined in each Ofsted school report, leadership and management is evaluated based on the 
‘contribution of all the staff with responsibilities (…) to identifying priorities, directing and 
motivating staff and running the school’. Ofsted’s School Inspection Handbook specifies 
multiple processes and structures across leadership levels. Processes include providing a clear 
vision; pursuing and modelling high professional standards in teaching and achievement; 
effective financial management, governance, monitoring and self-evaluation, curriculum 
development and assessment as well as equality, health and safety regulations (Ofsted, 2015). 
Inspectors are also required to examine the operation of performance management, and to 
check that the proportion of awards corresponds to actual achievements by the school. More 
detail is provided in the appendix. The inspectors’ reports include an overall score for 
management ranging from ‘Outstanding’ through ‘Good’, ‘Requires improvement’ and 
‘Inadequate’ based on the inspectorate’s understanding of good educational outcomes and 
management practices13. The reports are placed in the public domain to inform parents and 
local communities about their schools, and to guide the work of the Education Department in 
securing high standards for the nation’s schools. The inspectors pay special attention to rates 
of progress as opposed to simple levels of achievement, and in this sense provide a control 
for some of the factors affective levels of achievement such as deprivation. They are taken 
very seriously by schools themselves, and a bad report can have very serious consequences 
for a school and its leadership. The inspectorate knows that poorly conducted inspections 
may be challenged. 
No single index can capture the complexity of a school’s life and management, so it is 
important to ask whether its use by other researchers has led to meaningful results that 
validate the inspectorate scores as measures of educational and management effectiveness. 
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On the educational side, Besley at al. (2006) find a relationship between their own indicators 
of management quality management scores and inspection judgements in a pilot study of 
schools in England. Hussain (2012) shows that inspectors’ ‘ratings that make it easier to 
distinguish between more and less effective schools; and […] they are able to identify poorly 
performing schools, leading to test score gains’, and Allen and Burgess (2012), by comparing 
marginally failing with marginally passing schools, show that school critical inspection 
reports lead to improvements in school performance. In addition, the more detailed indicators 
of management style enabled Currie et al (2007) to develop a typology of models of head 
teacher leadership.  
Table 6: School inspectors’ leadership scores compared with teacher evaluations of 
school leadership and PRP, 2014-2015.14 
Ofsted 
Leadership 
Grade 
Leaders 
involve 
teachers in 
SDP 
Systemati
c appraisal 
procedure
s 
PRP 
Motivates 
PRP 
divisive N 
1: Outstanding 0.070 -0.048 0.074 0.032 340 
2: Good 0.046 0.064 -0.022 -0.043 654 
3: Requires 
Improvement -0.219 -0.059 0.031 0.047 170 
4: Inadequate -0.537 -0.506 -0.524 0.310 30 
 
  
  
 
Total 0 0 0 0 1194 
Anova F 5.33 4.49 4.02 2.63  
p>F 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.049  
 
Note:	 The scores for each variable have been computed such that roughly two-thirds of observations should fall within the 
range of +1 or -1 about a mean of zero. Information on appraisals and PRP attitudes has been aggregated across questions, 
see Tables 1 and 2 above, using factor analysis for the full sample over both years. The scores show deviations from the 
mean score for all Ofsted grades for the panel sample in 2014 and 2015. This was necessary because the factor scores were 
computed from the full sample including those not in the panel. Involvement in the school development plan was computed 
from the original five point Likert scale for that variable. The F statistic is computed by ANOVA comparing the variation of 
scores between Ofsted grades with that within those grades. The probability that the scores by Ofsted grade are statistically 
significant is shown the bottom row: 0.004 means there is less than 1% (0.4%) probability the overall differences between 
Ofsted grades are due to chance.  
The grades awarded have the merit of providing an overall judgement based on evidence 
provided by schools and a two-day intensive visit. For the present study, the inspectorate 
scores have the advantage of providing an external source of information about the quality of 
management in individual schools that is independent of the survey responses. Moreover, the 
distribution of grades awarded to schools in the survey correspond quite closely to national 
inspection results reported by Ofsted (see Appendix 1). 
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These leadership ratings for each school can be linked to teachers’ responses in the survey. 
Table 6 compares the inspectorate’s leadership scores with the teacher replies about whether 
appraisals are systematic, whether leaders involve teachers in school governance, and 
whether PRP is experienced as motivating or divisive for 2014-2015. Generally speaking, in 
schools whose leadership is more highly rated by Ofsted, both teacher involvement and 
systematic appraisal appear stronger than in those with poor Ofsted ratings. The same is true 
for PRP: it is seen as more motivating (less demotivating) and less divisive in schools that are 
better led. The differences are particularly strong compared with schools whose leadership 
Ofsted judged Inadequate. Thus well-managed schools appear to be more likely to involve 
teachers more in establishing school-wide priorities, and have systematic appraisal 
procedures, , and to have less divisive evaluations of PRP. Table 7 seeks to examine all of 
these factors simultaneously using regression analysis. 
The discussion so far has shown that whether teachers find PRP motivating or divisive, the 
quality of the review procedures, involvement in their school’s governance and the external 
leadership scores are interrelated. Existing research suggests a different relationship between 
involvement and good procedures on the one hand and whether PRP is seen as motivating or 
divisive on the other. The reviews by Locke and Latham’s (2002) and by Cawley et al (1998) 
suggest that involving teachers in determining school objectives is likely to motivate them 
because in this way they take ownership of their work objectives, and it creates a more 
collegial atmosphere. Thus participative management is more likely to create a basis for 
shared objectives, and linking pay to their achievement can then be experienced as 
reinforcing this process. In contrast, according to Greenberg et al (2001), procedural justice 
theory suggests that poor objective setting and evaluation procedures can undermine teachers’ 
confidence in the fairness of PRP, as they see their chances of reward reduced even when 
their performance warrants it. Lack of involvement would similarly increase feelings of 
unfairness. These two models are sketched out in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Possible relationship between school leadership quality and whether teachers 
find PRP motivating or divisive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School	leadership:	
good	quality	
Systematic	appraisal	
procedures	
Teachers	more	likely	to	
find	PRP	motivating	
Leaders	involve	
teachers	in	SDP	
School	leadership:	
‘fire-fighting’	
Unsystematic	
appraisal	procedures	
Teachers	more	likely	to	
find	PRP	divisive	
Teachers	not	
involved	in	SDP	
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In the upper model, good leadership, as evaluated by Ofsted is associated with well-
implemented appraisal procedures and involvement of teachers in establishing the priorities 
of the School Development Plan, and in such an environment, teachers are more likely to find 
PRP motivating. In the second, weaker leadership, again as evaluated by Ofsted, is associated 
with less well implemented performance review procedures and less involvement of teachers 
in the SDP, and in this environment teachers are more likely to find PRP divisive. 
These two models are compared with the survey data in Table 7, using a two-level regression 
which estimates the effect of management quality on involvement and appraisal, and then the 
effect of the latter two on teachers’ views of PRP  In this procedure, ‘seemingly unrelated 
regression’, the presence of an ‘effect’ does not necessarily imply causation. Considering the 
upper panel, on the right hand side, in schools where leaders involve teachers in developing 
the priorities of the school development plan, which is a central reference point for teachers’ 
performance reviews, teachers are nearly 20% (0.193) more likely to report PRP as 
motivating than in other schools. Likewise, they are nearly 20% (-0.189) less likely to find 
PRP divisive. In contrast, the effect of systematic appraisal procedures is not significant for 
motivation, but it is related to feelings of divisiveness (about 10% more, 0.112). The rest of 
the upper panel confirms the effects of teachers’ opportunities for performance based 
progression by virtue of their position on the pay spine discussed earlier. 
The lower panel shows the link between teacher involvement and appraisal procedures on the 
one hand, and the quality of school leadership as assessed by the most recent school 
inspection. Taking schools with an ‘Outstanding’ rating as the benchmark, the left-hand side 
shows that the relationship with SDP involvement declines as the Ofsted grade deteriorates. 
Thus compared with an ‘Outstanding’ school, teachers in one graded ‘Inadequate’ are 50% 
less likely to experience SDP involvement, and consequently will find PRP about 8-9% less 
motivating than other teachers (-0.50 x 0.17). Turning to appraisals, it appears that both 
Outstanding and Inadequate schools are less well-equipped with systematic procedures than 
the others. This may be partly because of the small sample size where a few exceptions may 
distort the result. It may also reflect a general tightening up of statutory appraisal, and 
especially feedback procedures in many schools (Table 4 above) made necessary by the link 
with pay. It may also reflect the focus on statutory aspects of appraisal quality which were 
used for methodological reasons discussed earlier, and which do not distinguish between the 
spirit and the letter of appraisal rules.15 
Use of inspectors’ management grades requires some caution in interpreting the results of the 
present study. As inspections normally operate on the three-yearly cycle, it is likely that 
adverse reports from early in the cycle have been followed by improvements in school 
management and in educational results. Equally, recent but unexpectedly negative inspections 
may have an adverse effect on teacher morale, and colour some attitudes measured in the 
current survey. However, in the latter case, the effect on teacher morale is more likely to stem 
from the inspectors’ overall educational grading, rather than the narrower grading for 
leadership. 
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Table 7:  Perceptions of PRP as motivating or divisive by spine point and school 
management style 201516 
 
PRP 
motivates 
PRP 
divisive 
 Coef. Std. Err. sig Coef. Std. Err. sig 
Leaders involve  
teachers in SDP 0.173  0.033  **** -0.176  0.028  **** 
Systematic appraisal  
procedures 0.030  0.035  - -0.113  0.030  **** 
Primary school -0.041  0.077  - 0.055  0.065  - 
Part-time -0.137  0.082  * 0.027  0.070  - 
Female 0.092  0.070  + -0.002  0.060  - 
Spine point       
Spine pt M5 -1.104  0.325  **** 0.156  0.276  - 
Spine pt M6 -0.419  0.162  **** 0.134  0.138  - 
Spine pt U1 -0.166  0.172  - 0.068  0.147  - 
Spine pt U2 -0.048  0.168  - 0.174  0.143  - 
Spine pt U3 -0.310  0.094  **** 0.221  0.080  **** 
Spine pt Ldr1-5 -0.013  0.219  - 0.021  0.186  - 
 
      
Movement up a spine 
Point 2014-2015 0.239  0.122  ** -0.206  0.103  ** 
Spine point in 2015  
& receipt  of award       
Rise to M5  0.943  0.374  *** -0.100  0.318  - 
Rise to M6 0.393  0.227  * 0.136  0.193  - 
Rise to U1 0.618  0.230  **** -0.353  0.195  * 
Rise to U2 -0.048  0.197  - -0.116  0.167  - 
Rise to U3 0.023  0.116  - -0.067  0.099  - 
Rise within L1-5 0.402  0.288  + -0.339  0.245  + 
Constant -0.383  0.119  **** 0.374  0.101  **** 
N  781   780  
R2  
0.1002 
****  0.0992 **** 
 
 
Leaders involve teachers in SDP Systematic appraisal procedures 
Ofsted leadership 
score Coef. Std. Err. sig Coef. Std. Err. sig 
Grade 2 -0.019  0.076  - 0.271  0.072  **** 
Grade 3 -0.232  0.118  ** 0.234  0.112  ** 
Grade 4 -0.501  0.256  * -0.204  0.244  - 
Primary school 0.281  0.081  **** -0.025  0.077  - 
Constant  2.499  0.053  **** 0.184  0.051  **** 
R2  
0.0267 
****  0.0215 **** 
N  781   781  
Notes: SURE: Seemingly unrelated regression. Missing values for leaders involve in SDP and for appraisal 
procedures for 2015 were dealt with by using responses for 2014 and taking the average across both years for all 
respondents. Panel sample, unweighted. Ofsted Grade 1 is benchmark grade. 
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8.  Is stronger perceived motivation of PRP related to higher performance? 
How employees feel about their pay systems, whether they find them motivating and fair, is 
an important aspect of their job satisfaction, but it does not necessarily affect their job 
performance. This section explores whether there is a link between teachers’ prior views 
about whether they find PRP motivating (reported in the 2014 survey), and their subsequent 
achievement of the objectives set in their performance reviews (reported in the 2015 survey). 
As discussed earlier, these reviews are designed to cover a wide range of aspects of 
classroom performance, including pupil progress, as established in the objective setting 
meeting. The criteria are judgemental, and so schools may vary in how specifically objectives 
are defined, and how strictly they are assessed. However, such variation is limited by the 
obligation on school inspectors to examine the overall relationship between school 
performance and the percentage of positive reviews, and to challenge significant divergences. 
This is an input into their grading of school leadership performance. Additionally, many 
teachers are at the top of their respective pay scales so that they can only progress by 
promotion, through the Threshold onto the Upper Pay Scale, or onto the Leadership Scale. 
Although these are all part of the performance management system in schools, they involve a 
more complex evaluation than the annual cycle of objective setting and performance review. 
If the system is working as designed, then teachers who meet the objectives of their 
performance reviews should receive a recommendation on pay, which if validated by the 
leadership and governing body, should lead to pay progression. Thus, with the exception of 
those at the top of their respective pay scales, one may use the receipt of pay progression as 
an indicator that their school recognises that they have met their performance objectives. This 
is examined in Table 8, which considers perceived motivation and spine position in the 
previous year, 2014, and subsequent achievement of objectives as reported in 2015. We have 
therefore a measure of whether teachers who said they found PRP motivating at the start of 
the cycle, went on to achieve their objectives by the end, a year later. 
The results in the upper panel show that teachers who found PRP motivating in 2014 were 
about 45% ((1.444 – 1) x 100) more likely to have met their objectives than other teachers 
who had received either a negative recommendation, or no recommendation at all. To put this 
into perspective, roughly a fifth of the panel teachers had responded positively to the 
motivational questions (Table 1 above), the others being either uncertain or negative. In 
addition, only about a third of the panel sample reported having received a recommendation, 
and of these roughly half had progression, representing about a sixth of the overall panel 
sample. 17 
Being on the scale maximum (M6 for the Main and U3 for the Upper Scale) in 2014 has the 
expected effect: pay recommendations are less likely (coefficients below one) whether or not 
for progression. Variation between schools in the strictness of reviews and progression is 
captured potentially in the link between higher rates of progression in schools that inspectors 
awarded lower inspection grades for their leadership. 
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Table 8. Comparison of perceived motivation in 2014 with appraised performance in 
2015: benchmark: teachers reporting  recommendation on pay18 
Panel A: without interactions 
 Received a recommendation on pay in 2015 
 No pay progression awarded in 2015 Pay progression awarded in 2015 
 (objectives presumed not met) (objectives presumed achieved) 
 
Coef. RRR Std. Err. 
 
Coef. RRR Std. Err. 
 PRP motivates 2014 1.030  0.132  - 1.444  0.173  **** 
Primary school 1.345  0.384  - 1.272  0.356  - 
Part-time 1.013  0.299  - 0.595  0.199  + 
Female 0.723  0.194  - 0.863  0.227  - 
On main scale max: 2014 0.328  0.163  ** 0.771  0.244  - 
On upper scale max: 2014 0.682  0.153  * 0.015  0.015  **** 
Ofsted leadership 2 1.357  0.340  - 1.642  0.451  * 
Ofsted leadership 3 1.064  0.425  - 2.249  0.862  ** 
Ofsted leadership 4 0.393  0.418  - 0.306  0.347  - 
Constant  0.315  0.079  **** 0.277  0.073  **** 
Number of obs 777 
     Pseudo R2 0.0892 
     Table 8: Panel B: including interactions between motivation and being on a scale maximum 
 (objectives presumed not met) (objectives presumed achieved) 
 
Coef. RRR Std. Err. 
 
Coef. RRR Std. Err. 
 PRP motivates 2014 0.890  0.168  - 1.251  0.162  * 
Primary school 1.349  0.384  - 1.279  0.363  - 
Part-time 0.985  0.289  - 0.552  0.190  * 
Female 0.715  0.190  - 0.856  0.229  - 
On main scale max: 2014 0.344  0.171  ** 0.634  0.236  - 
On upper scale max: 2014 0.682  0.152  * 0.005  0.005  **** 
M6 in 2014 & PRP 
motivates 1.828  0.756  + 3.019  1.249  **** 
U3 in 2014 & PRP 
motivates 1.353  0.325  - 0.149  0.030  **** 
Ofsted leadership 2 1.328  0.332  - 1.584  0.438  * 
Ofsted leadership 3 1.090  0.440  - 2.412  0.951  ** 
Ofsted leadership 4 0.392  0.413  - 0.306  0.344  - 
Constant  0.322  0.082  **** 0.291  0.076  **** 
Number of obs 777 
     Pseudo R2 0.0979 
     Notes: Coefficients in columns 2 and 5 compare those who reported receiving a recommendation on pay with 
those who did not, and are based on a multinomial logit regression with 595 observations and a pseudo-R2 of 
0.0565. Coefficients should be read horizontally, and compare with the benchmark case of no progression and 
no recommendation. The dependent variable comprised three categories: No recommendation on pay in 2015, 
Recommendation on pay 2015 a) without pay progression, and b) with pay progression. It is presumed that most 
negative recommendations result in an absence of pay progression, and most positive ones, in progression. 
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The lower panel of Table 8 separates the different effects of motivation for along-scale 
progression from between-scale progression at the Threshold. This is done by introducing an 
interaction between perceived motivation and whether teachers were at the top of the Main or 
the Upper Scales at the start of the cycle, in 2014. Teachers who said PRP was motivating at 
the outset were about three times more likely to have achieved threshold progression at the 
end of the cycle. Progression at M6 entails movement to U1, in other words, success in 
passing the Threshold. However, separating out the Threshold in the model almost halves the 
effect of motivation on progression in general shown in the upper panel from 45% (1.44) to 
25% (1.251), still important, but potentially weaker than that of Threshold progression. 
Thus a tentative conclusion is that strong motivation is associated with good performance 
among the teachers who are eligible for PRP, and that the effect of progression at the 
Threshold is stronger than for progression along the current pay scales. Nevertheless, this is 
subject to some ‘health warnings’. First, PRP may be acting as a ‘lightning rod’ for other 
problems, such as workload, which could cause teachers to be cynical about PRP and find 
their objectives hard to achieve. Second, the achievement of objectives is inferred from the 
combination of a pay recommendation and pay progression. Although the Education 
Department’s guidance to schools is that progression should follow performance, it is 
possible that some schools may delay progression because of financial pressures. Many 
respondents were of this view (see Table 2, last question), and this has also been reflected in 
casework by the teachers’ unions. Third, it is also possible that some schools are more 
demanding than others in the award of good appraisal ratings and pay progression. An 
indication of this may be seen in Table 8 in the coefficients on the ‘Ofsted leadership grades’ 
in the right-hand panel. These suggest that compared with grade 1 ‘Excellent’ schools, those 
with grade 2, and even more so, those with grade 3, are more likely to award pay progression. 
Note that the remit of inspectors includes the rigour with which performance management is 
operated. Finally, at just under 800, the sample is quite small. 
9.  Conclusions 
The study shows that both the overall design and local management operation of performance 
pay are important. As concerns design, one of the most striking findings is the differentiation 
of teachers’ perceptions of PRP according to where they stand on the teachers’ pay spines: 
whether or not this gives them scope to benefit from performance related progression, 
whether or not they are at the top of their pay scale, and if they were at other points, whether 
they feel they have lost out as a result of loss of automatic increments.. Few organisations 
introduce performance pay in a greenfield location. It is much more common to do so in a 
way that involves movement from an established reward system for incumbent employees, 
and management teams. How the opportunities to benefit from the new incentives are 
distributed has been seen to have a clear effect on perceptions of motivation and divisiveness. 
There is also some evidence, relating to design, that teachers feel more at ease with pay 
linked to promotion than with annual performance objectives, as reflected in Threshold as 
compared with performance related progression. 
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The more important question relates to operation and management quality. In large-scale 
organisations with many local units, top management has to work with local management 
teams with differing levels of expertise and effectiveness. In so far as the school inspectorate 
provides a good measure of these, it is clear that employees in better managed units are more 
likely to find performance related pay motivating, and less so where management is more 
engaged in fire-fighting. Moreover, the study suggests that involvement of employees and to 
a lesser extent, having systematic appraisals, are important channels through which more 
effective management may take effect. Finally, do employee attitudes to PRP matter, or are 
they like the weather, a subject of eternal complaint, but something people learn to live with? 
The latter section of the paper suggests that teachers who appeared more motivated in 2014 
when the scheme was introduced were more likely to achieve their objectives than those who 
were not. The same analysis suggests that school leaderships that were deemed by inspectors 
to be less effective were more likely to award pay progression, possibly reflecting retention 
and other pressures on them. 
As with all empirical studies, there are limitations, notably in this case in terms of the 
response. Teachers’ participation in this kind of survey is a demand on scarce free time, and 
although discussion with the teachers’ unions suggests that the response is relatively good for 
an unpaid online survey, it nevertheless is a limitation in terms of potential bias and statistical 
significance. Finally, although teaching, like many highly educated professions, provides 
scope for high levels of job discretion, and intrinsic motivation, it is likely to attract people 
who value these characteristics, and this may colour their beliefs about and attitudes towards 
performance pay. 
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10. Appendix 1: Explanation of the Ofsted grades for management in schools  
Ofsted inspectors visit schools regularly about every three years, and more frequently for 
schools in difficulty. Normally, there is a team of inspectors with one lead inspector, and 
visits last about two days, involving a review of documentary evidence on school policies, 
including the School Development/Improvement Plan and Self-Evaluation documents, 
outcomes, and pupil performance, interviews with selected role holders notably in senior and 
middle management, classroom observations, and feedback from pupils and parents (Ofsted 
2015). Inspectors have a specific list of evidence items to review, which is set out in detail in 
the Ofsted School Inspection Handbook.19 They are required to assess overall effectiveness in 
terms of the quality of education provided of the schools they visit. This covers a number of 
domains including the quality of leadership and management; the behaviour and safety of 
pupils; the quality of teaching; achievement of pupils; and the effectiveness of early years and 
of sixth form provision. For each of these domains, there is a set of descriptors for the four 
grades used: outstanding, good, requires improvement, and inadequate. There is a strong 
focus on outcomes and where processes are evaluated it is usually in relation to targeted 
outcomes. 
Inspections focus primarily on quality of education for the school’s pupils, but in recent years, 
Ofsted has been given the brief to examine the quality of leadership and management in so 
far as they contribute to educational quality. This is reflected in the opening sentences of the 
section on management: ‘In reaching their judgement on leadership and management, 
inspectors should consider the school’s use of performance management and effectiveness of 
strategies for improving teaching, including the extent to which the school takes account of 
the ‘Teachers’ Standards’’ (Ofsted 2015 January no. 120101: §159). 
There then follows a list of items through which effective leadership is demonstrated, and 
which inspectors should investigate:  
• effectiveness of procedures for monitoring the quality of teaching and learning, and 
tackling underperformance;  
• the strength of the link between performance management, appraisal and salary 
progression; 
• how well leadership groups manage staff performance and use the staff budget to 
differentiate appropriately between high and low performers;  
• coherence and effectiveness of professional development, and opportunities provided 
for promotion, and its link to identified needs of staff; 
• accuracy with which best practice is identified, modelled and shared; 
• whether less than good performance is rigorously managed and appropriate training 
and support are provided; and whether good performance is recognised through the 
performance management process;  
• whether anonymised information about performance management, appraisal and 
salary progression corresponds to numbers of teachers meeting their performance 
management objectives for the previous three years. 
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Initially, the grade descriptors for ‘outstanding’ and ‘good’ schools include a section on the 
quality of performance management, and its contribution to improvements in teaching and 
learning, and in professional development for all staff. However, in the revised version of 
Sept 2015, the references to performance management contained the same principles but 
were less prescriptive (§138). 
The distribution of Ofsted grades as in 2014 shows that the modal grade is ‘Good’, with 
similar percentages of schools classed as ‘Outstanding’ and ‘Requires improvement’. The 
share of schools classed ‘Inadequate’ is very small. The distribution of schools by Ofsted 
grade in the current survey is very close to the national picture (Appendix Table 1). 
	
Appendix Table 1: Overall effectiveness of open maintained schools and academies at 
their most recent inspection as at 31 August 2014 
School type No of schools 
inspected 
Outstanding Good Requires 
improvement 
Inadequate 
Primary 
schools (total) 
16,266 17 64 16 2 
CEP Survey 
2014 
 16 68 16 0 
Secondary 
schools(total) 
3,150 21 49 23 6 
CEP Survey 
2014 
 26 50 20 4 
 
Source: Ofsted (2014: 36) and CEP survey.  
11. Appendix 2: Survey method and potential sample selection bias 
Teachers’ views were obtained by means of a random sample survey sent by the teachers’ 
unions to about 10% of their membership with the addresses drawn from their membership 
lists. Unionisation among school teachers is very high, at roughly 90%20, so the effect of any 
bias should be small. The survey was administered in the spring months of each year. 
Participation was voluntary, and respondents were asked to compose their personal 
confidential id code according to a fixed method which could be replicated for future replies, 
and so used to link replies without providing personal details. Those who wished to take part 
in the follow-up were also asked if they would provide their contact email. Respondents were 
also asked to provide the name and postcode of their schools so that their replies could be 
linked to school level data from other sources, such as those of school inspector reports and 
the DfE. To boost the panel element, the unions were asked, if possible, to use the same 
sample of contact emails from year to year, combined with a refreshment sample. The total 
usable response in 2014 was just under 3,000 (4,600 in total), and in 2015, 1,000 (1,300 in 
total), and about 790 records could be linked between the two years for the panel. 
Comparison of certain demographic characteristics of respondents and details of schools 
between the 2014 survey and the School Workforce Census21 showed good coverage of the 
teacher population and school types (see below and Marsden, 2015). The most notable 
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divergence was that the response was notably higher among more senior teachers on the 
higher points of the school teachers’ salary scale. For this reason, many of the analyses in this 
paper have been weighted to give a truer reflection of the overall population of teachers. 
Comparison of sample response by salary spine point with School Workforce Census 2013 
Salary Spine 
point Full sample Panel sample 
School 
Workforce 
Census 
 2014 2014/2015 2013 
 % % % 
UQT 0.0 0.0 n.a 
M1-2 5.5 5.2 16.1 
M3-4 8.2 8.2 13.4 
M5 4.4 4.4 6.1 
M6 13.3 9.9 12.6 
U1 12.5 13.2 13.3 
U2 12.3 12.2 9.8 
U3 39.3 43.2 25.8 
L1-3 4.6 3.6 2.9 
    
Total 100 100 100 
Total 2648 745  
Note: responses giving sufficient detail on pay to enable matching. 
Classroom teachers: demographic characteristics 
Characteristic 2014 
Response  
composition % 
School work-
force  
census 2012 (%) 
Characteristic	 2014 
Response  
composition %	
School work-
force  
census 2012 (%)	
Gender   Age	 %	 	
Female  71.1 75 Under 25 years	 2.4	 6	
Male  28.9 25 25-29 	 10.0	 18	
Total % 100 100 30-34 	 12.7	 17	
N 2876  35-39 	 13.3	 14	
   40-44 	 15.7	 13	
Employment 
status 
  45-49 	 16.0	 11	
Full-time  81.8 76 50-54 	 15.1	 10	
Part-time  18.2 24 55-59 	 11.4	 9	
   60 and above 	 3.4	 2	
Total %  100 100 Total %	 100	 100	
N 2875  N (complete 
replies)	
2883	 	
 
Sample selection bias is a concern with all voluntary response surveys, and in the present 
survey, that the degree of discontent among teachers is exaggerated as the most discontented 
my reply in greater numbers. This cannot be tested directly, but limited comparison is 
possible with the teacher respondents in the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
who replied to a number questions about their schools covering views of relations with their 
managers, including trust, commitment, and shared values. The same questions were included 
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in the CEP survey, in part, to enable benchmarking. The results are shown below for the first 
wave of the survey, and include comparisons with an earlier CEP study of teachers in 2000 
(for fuller details see Marsden, 2015, Table 5). The results in the CEP surveys are quite close 
to each other and to those of WERS, albeit showing slightly stronger negative attitudes 
compared with WERS. Moreover, in discussions with the teachers’ unions, it was suggested 
that teachers’ attitudes could have been more negative, especially in 2014 owing to discontent 
over increased workloads. 
Thus, comparison with WERS results for teachers suggests that there may be some selection 
bias in terms of more discontented teachers took the time to complete the questionnaire, but it 
is at worst moderate, and it is also likely that a share of the increased negative view compared 
with 2011 is the result of uncertainty surrounding the new pay system and the problems of 
teachers’ workloads, the latter being recognised by the employers. 
Teachers’ attitudes towards their schools: a comparison with other sources. 
 
 Disagree Neutral Agree 
I am proud to tell people who I work for 
Teachers 2014 (CEP) 12.3 21.6 66.1 
Teachers 2000 (CEP) 10.7 21.5 67.8 
WERS 2011 teachers 5.3 14.1 80.6 
WERS 2011 all employees (excl teachers) 9.3 23.2 67.6 
    
I share many of the values of my organisation 
Teachers 2014 (CEP) 11.4 14.1 74.6 
WERS 2011 teachers 3.9 8.9 87.2 
WERS 2011 all employees (excl teachers) 7.9 27.7 64.4 
    
I feel loyal to my organisation 
Teachers 2014 (CEP) 12.9 15.3 71.8 
WERS 2011 teachers 4.8 8.1 87.0 
WERS 2011 all employees (excl teachers) 7.9 17.5 74.6 
    
Using my own initiative I carry out tasks that are not  required as part of my job 
Teachers 2014* (CEP) 3.5 28.0 68.5 
WERS 2011 teachers 3.8 12.4 83.9 
WERS 2011 all employees (excl teachers) 9.1 20.4 70.5 
Notes: * Teachers 2014 classified responses on initiative as 'never', 'sometimes' 'quite often' and 'very 
often'. 'Sometimes' was classified as 'neutral' and quite and very often as 'agree'.  
Source: Marsden 2015, Table 5. 
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13. Endnotes 
																																								 																				
1	Revised	version	of	document	‘Teachers	PRP	2014-2015	COPE	20170111.docx’.	
	
2 However, this view was not universally held: many in the teachers’ and head teachers’ associations argued that 
the observed high pass rates were due to pre-selection by schools of their candidates for advancement. 
 
3 A full account of the survey methods and checks on response balance can be found in Marsden (2015). 
 
4 See School Workforce Census for 2013, Tables 7a and 7b, and method appendix to this paper. 
 
5 Cronbach’s Alpha, measure of internal consistency for an index based on several separate questions, for the 
PRP motivates index was 0.85 and for the divisiveness one, 0.65 when computed on the whole sample. 
 
6 Strictly speaking, they were not significantly different from the benchmark category of junior teachers on M1 
and M2. The views of this category were close to the average for all teachers, that is negative overall, but not 
more so than teachers on the intervening spine points. 
 
7 Program: reg ppgood4_1415 sal_rise lag_spine_max sal_lag_m6 sal_lag_u3 part_time female sk_primary   if 
year==2015 & panel==1 , robust; reg ppdiv4_1415 sal_rise lag_spine_max sal_lag_m6 sal_lag_u3 part_time 
female sk_primary   if year==2015 & panel==1 , robust. 
8 Program: reg ppgood4_1415  m3_4-l1_5 rise_m3_4 rise_m5 rise_m6 rise_u1 rise_u2 rise_u3 rise_l1_5 
part_time female sk_primary [pweight=panel_wt2]   if year==2015 & panel==1 , robust 
 
9 Progams: tab2 year objspec if panel==1, row chi2, for variables:  objspec expmonit objpupprog oppperf objsdp 
exp_payknow  ppfedbak ppreson  ppprevious  ppclassobs  pp_payrec 
 
10 An analysis of who had a performance review in 2014 and 2015 showed that most of those who had not had 
one in 2014 did have one in 2015, suggesting that in such cases, the system was less well embedded in their 
schools. 
11 Cronbach’s Alpha, for ‘good procedures’, was 0.95 for the whole sample, indicating a high degree of 
consistency among the questions selected for the index. 
12 programs used: bysort year: tab2 obj_proc_1415_bin ppgood1_1415_bin , row chi2; bysort year: tab2 
obj_proc_1415_bin ppdiv1_1415_bin , row chi2; bysort year: tab2 ldrs_sdp_good ppgood1_1415_bin, row chi2; 
bysort year: tab2 ldrs_sdp_good ppdiv1_1415_bin, row chi2; bysort year: tab2 obj_proc_1415_bin 
ldrs_sdp_good , row chi2 
13 See the School Inspection Handbook, (Ofsted, 2015) and  http://www.clerktogovernors.co.uk/ofsted/ofsted-
grade-descriptors-quality-of-leadership-in-and-management-of-the-school/  
 
14 Programs: use "C:\Users\MARSDEND\Dropbox\DATA_TEMP\Teachers_prp_anon_2014_15.dta", clear; 
tabstat ppgood1_1415 if panel==1  , statistics( mean semean count ) by(ofsted_leadership_14_15); oneway 
ppgood1_1415 ofsted_leadership_14_15 if panel==1; variables: ppgood1_1415, ppdiv1_1415, ldrs_sdp, 
obj_proc_1415, ofsted_leadership_14_15. 
15 The r2 statistic measures both the percentage of the variation in the leadership involvement and the systematic 
appraisal variables accounted for by the Ofsted management quality grades and the amount of ‘noise’ in its 
measurement. Because the number of teacher respondents in each school was very small, often only one, the 
amount of ‘noise’ will have been great. Such noise arises because there is variation in teacher perceptions within 
every school, and it is inevitable that respondents’ views may not always be typical of all teachers in their 
schools. The value of the coefficient on management grade conveys information about the strength and size of 
its relationship with teacher involvement and appraisal quality, whereas the low r2 statistic indicates the amount 
of noise in that relationship. 
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16 Programs: sureg (ppgood4_1415 = ldrs_sdp_av obj_proc_new_av sk_primary  part_time female uqt-u2 
sal_rise sal_uqt-sal_u2 ) (obj_proc_new_av =  ofsted_ldr_2 ofsted_ldr_3 ofsted_ldr_4  sk_primary   year) 
(ldrs_sdp_av =  ofsted_ldr_2 ofsted_ldr_3 ofsted_ldr_4  sk_primary )if panel==1 & year==2015; sureg 
(ppdiv4_1415 = ldrs_sdp_av obj_proc_new_av sk_primary  part_time female uqt-u2 sal_rise sal_uqt-sal_u2 ) 
(obj_proc_new_av =  ofsted_ldr_2 ofsted_ldr_3 ofsted_ldr_4  sk_primary   year) (ldrs_sdp_av =  ofsted_ldr_2 
ofsted_ldr_3 ofsted_ldr_4  sk_primary )if panel==1 & year==2015 
17 The sample was weighted to compensate for uneven response rates by salary spine point – to compensate for 
over-reporting by those at the top of their pay scales. About 68% of the weighted panel sample in 2015 reported 
no recommendation on pay, and those who reported a recommendation divided roughly evenly between not 
getting and getting progression (17% and 14%). 
 
18	mlogit rise_payrec_r lag_ppgood1_1415  sk_primary part_time female lag_m6 lag_u3 pp_lag_m6 pp_lag_u3 
ofsted_ldr_2 ofsted_ldr_3 ofsted_ldr_4  [pweight=panel_wt2] if panel==1 & year==2015 , robust baseoutcome 
(0) rrr 
19 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/ofsted-inspections-of-maintained-schools  
 
20 Based on total membership as reported on the TUC website of ATL (127.9k), NASUWT (294.2k), NUT 
(326.9k), UCAC (3.9k) and NAHT (28.5k) (total 777.5k), divided by total teaching FTE in the 2014 School 
Workforce Census (848.8k). ASCL and Voice membership were not reported by the TUC. 
 
21 School Workforce Census:  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/school-workforce-in-england-
november-2012  
